



Oil Market Webinar

Opening up the taps. Is this oil price war different?

MARCH 12, 2020

Speakers:



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


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Housekeeping


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- Submit questions via the Q&A chat box



The screenshot shows a window titled "Q&A" with a settings icon, a minus sign, and a close button in the top right corner. Inside the window, there is a "Refresh Now" link in blue. Below it is a large text area containing the text "This is a test question" and "This is a test answer". At the bottom of the window, there is a text input field with the placeholder text "Please enter a question" and a blue "Submit" button.

- Please fill out the pop-up survey at the end to provide feedback
- Slide deck and recording will be circulated after the webinar





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Key discussion points:

Why did the Saudis and Russians fall out?

How is the U.S. shale industry situated to cope compared to the last oil price fall in 2014-2016?

How does this price collapse compare to others in 2014-16, 2008-2009, 1998-1999, 1986-1987?

How might this play out? Who will blink first?

Who is best placed financially and politically for an oil price war? How long might a production free-for-all last?

What does it mean for the oil majors? Which companies are best and least prepared to weather a price war?

What does the global supply-demand balance look like for this year?

What are the best/worse case scenarios for oil demand from coronavirus?

Does a low oil price derail efficiency gains and the shift to renewables in the transport industry?


What does market structure look like, will there be a big contango play? What does that mean for the tanker industry?

Volume warfare in the oil market
Saudi Arabia, Russia, the United States and the balance of power

JOHN KEMP
REUTERS

11 Mar 2020

Saudi Arabia and Russia have lost market share to the United States
U.S. output has doubled since 2011, while Saudi and Russia output has stagnated



Source: Joint Organisations Data Initiative

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
U.S. shale sector has become marginal supplier to the global market
Shale has captured all incremental global consumption when Brent >\$70 per barrel

Global oil consumption and production, 2012-2019

	Incremental million barrels per day			U.S. supplies all global incremental consumption?
	Global oil consumption	U.S. crude production	L48 crude production ex Gulf	
2012	1.0	0.9	0.9	NO
2013	1.6	1.0	1.0	NO
2014	0.9	1.3	1.2	YES
2015	1.9	0.7	0.5	NO
2016	1.7	-0.6	-0.7	NO
2017	1.7	0.5	0.4	NO
2018	1.4	1.6	1.6	YES
2019	0.8	1.2	1.1	YES

Sources: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration
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U.S. shale production has recorded fastest increase anywhere in history
Second shale boom (2017-2019) was adding +2 million b/d per year at its peak




Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

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U.S. oil production growth forecast to slow even before outbreak of volume war


Growth predicted to slow to +0.4 million b/d by Q4 2020 and +0.6 million by Q4 2021



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration ("Short-Term Energy Outlook", Jan 2020)
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
Oil prices expected to remain anchored around \$65 per barrel through 2024

U.S. shale acts as price maker, but cyclical volatility around average level



Global oil consumption hit by trade war in 2019 and now coronavirus in 2020

Consumption growth well below long-term trend of 1.4% per year in both years




Source: *BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019*

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Oil prices decline in response to deteriorating economic outlook


Decline consistent with synchronized global economic slowdown or recession



Source: ICE Futures Europe, National Bureau of Economic Research

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
Spot prices and calendar spreads have been sliding since the start of the year
Coronavirus weighing on market even before volume war



Both series are averaged over 30 trading days to smooth short-term volatility

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
Brent spreads plunged after OPEC⁺ failed to agree on further output restraint Saudi Arabia and Russia subsequently threaten to increase production



Price difference Brent month 1 and month 7 (U.S.\$/bbl)
Contango (-) or backwardation (+)

Source: ICE Futures, @JKempEnergy

Oil traders anticipate significant over-production and large build in inventories
Brent calendar spread reverts to largest contango since Nov 2016 (before OPEC⁺ launched)




Price difference Brent month 1 and month 7 (U.S.\$/bbl)
Contango (-) or backwardation (+)

Source: ICE Futures, @JKempEnergy

Brent calendar spread signaling large inventory build

Six-month spread in 10th percentile for all trading days since 1990



Strategic choices for Saudi Arabia and Russia

Protect prices or defend market share

Russia's strategy

- Stop erosion of market share
- Allow prices to fall in response to coronavirus
- Eliminate oversupply via price adjustment
- Force further slowdown in U.S. shale
- Incentivise faster consumption growth
- Permit long-term expansion of Russia output

Saudi Arabia's strategy

- Stop erosion of prices
- Accept further (temporary?) loss of market share
- Eliminate oversupply via OPEC⁺ output adjustment
- Extend and deepen OPEC⁺ production restraints
- Maximize short-term oil revenues

Volume warfare breaks out after OPEC⁺ fails to agree on deeper cuts
Other outcomes were possible but Saudi Arabia and Russia elected for volume war

Russia elects to end production controls rather than deepen them, preserves ability to raise output , force further reduction in shale production and defence market share

Saudi Arabia opts to go into punishment mode and communicates maximum pain strategy to market


- Signals flat out production
- Supply extra oil from stocks
- Increase maximum capacity

Escalate-to-negotiate strategy

- Attempt to engineer short-term crisis
- Force Russia to negotiate
- Force White House to intervene
- Avoid protracted period of low prices

U.S. oil production forecasts revised down as a result of lower prices

Production expected to be roughly flat year-on-year in Q4 2020 and 2021



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration ("Short-Term Energy Outlook", Mar 2020)
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Volume warfare

Strategy and outcomes similar to analysis of armed conflict

Volume warfare usually breaks out because one side or both miscalculates resolve or capacity to absorb pain, its own or others

Top policymakers sometimes opt to fight rather than appear weak in front of domestic and international audiences

Volume warfare tests resilience – willingness and ability to absorb short-term financial pain to protect long-term interests

Volume warfare establishes new balance of power or re-establishes deterrence among major producers

Thank You



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